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Abstract
For the last several years, US citizens have been experiencing severe threats of terrorism. While such
threats can significantly impact important factors for effective government operations such as citizens’
information demand and attitude toward the government, little is known about their potential effect on
citizens’ acceptance of e-Government services. In order to fill this gap, this study examines the effects of
perceived risks of terrorism and trustworthiness of the government, on citizens’ e-Government usage
intentions. The data was collected through two surveys with a one-year interval: during and after the war
in Iraq. The analysis revealed that citizens’ e-Government usage intentions can be significantly influenced
by perceived risks of terrorism and trustworthiness of the supreme government, as well as other factors
suggested by previous research. These relationships appear to vary depending on the domain and the type
of the particular e-Government service. Other findings and future research needs are also discussed.
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Introduction
For the last several years, many government organizations have been trying to transform into a more
efficient and effective organization by adopting new technologies, especially the Internet. At the federal
level, e-Government initiatives have developed various web-based public services such as FirstGov.gov, a
gateway to more than 180 million web pages from federal and state governments, Disasterhelp.gov, an
information source for about 15,000 emergency managers, Grants.gov, a government grant search and
application tool for more than $360 billion in annual grants, and IRS.gov that offers free on-line tax filing
services already used by more than 3.4 million taxpayers [1, 2]. In the 2003 fiscal year, $4,967,500 was
available for e-Government development [3]. State and local level governments also spent more than $1
billion in 2000 and most of them now provide a portal website for their constituents [4]. Nevertheless, the
increased public concern over terrorism and information security of US citizens is presenting new hurdles
as well as opportunities to for government efforts to leverage efficient technologies. 
According to a recent large-scale poll, half of Americans are worried about possible terrorist
attacks, including cyber-attacks on social infrastructure [5]. With the increased role played by the US
government in the international community, the threat is unlikely to be dissolved in the near future [6].
Even before the 9/11 attacks, information security and privacy were already the biggest public concerns in
e-Government development [7]. Meanwhile, US citizens’ dependency on the Internet for government
information and services, especially those related to national emergency, have greatly increased [8]. 56
percent of American Internet users went online for Iraq war-related information, such as how the war was
developing over time and how to prepare for possible terrorist attacks. During the war, US government
sites were a major information source, attracting 15 percent of American Internet users. Also, 17  percent
of American Internet users identified the Internet as the primary information source or communication
medium, a big leap from the 3 percent immediately before the 9/11 incidents  [9]. During the same period,
ironically, many government agencies had to take down previously available public information from
their websites for national security reasons in spite of the increasing demand of online government
information [10]. 1 
These conflicting pressures among factors such as technology utilization, external threat (i.e.,
terrorism) and security concerns, demands for government information, and government control for
public information can have much influence over citizens’ e-Government acceptance decisions and
behaviour, which in turn can confuse e-Government initiatives in understanding why some e-Government
services are readily accepted while some others fail to attract citizens. Therefore, an important and urgent
task assigned to e-Government initiatives in this turbulent environment is to understand how citizens’
perception of the risky environment affects their acceptance of e-Government services and to secure stable
functioning of e-Government operations. What are the risks that citizens are concerned with in the context
of e-Government service use? When citizens face a high risk, will they rely on safety information
available on an e-Government website? Will they provide personal information to an e-Government
website under such a risk? If not, how can e-Government agencies improve their services and realize the
potential benefits of information technology? Understanding public perceptions of risk and interaction
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with public websites are critical steps to effective risk-communication practice [11] and networked
communities [12]. However, few researchers have explored factors influencing citizens’ risk perception
and acceptance of e-Government services, and virtually nothing is known about the effect of external
threats. 
This study has a twofold objective. First, the paper, based on user acceptance theories in the
Management Information Systems (MIS) field, synthesizes a model that can explain citizens’ e-
Government usage intentions. Second, it empirically examines the effects of various types of risks in the
e-Government service context, collectively and in groups of functional domain. The types of risks
include: 
• risks from uncertain future behaviour of the supreme government2 and e-Government agencies, 
• security and privacy risk from the Internet, and 
• threats to public safety coming from the physical world. 
The last category of risks can include various threats to the safety of the general public posed by a
strategic adversary (e.g., enemy in a war, terrorists) or a natural disaster (e.g., hurricane, earthquake,
flood, epidemic disease), but this study focuses on the ‘risk of terrorism.’ For the first two types of risks –
risks regarding government authorities – we use the concept of ‘trustworthiness’ as the counter concept of
corresponding risks. The third risk from the Internet is also referred to, in a reverse manner, as ‘structural
assurance’ in order to contextualize our study within the framework of previous literature. Accordingly,
we integrate and extend theoretical models from traditional technology acceptance theories and e-
commerce research to include relevant concepts in the context of e-Government services. The resulting
model can take into account the effect of each risk as well as other factors influencing citizens’ intention
to use e-Government services. Also, the model will reveal differences of citizens’ intention formation
between terrorism related and unrelated e-Government services. 
The invasion in Iraq and subsequent occupation by the US provided a unique opportunity to study
citizens’ use of e-Government websites in a risky situation. Because the US government took a leading
role in the war, the risk of terrorist attack by the Iraqi regime or other adversaries was significantly
increased and the Department of Homeland Security had to raise the national terrorism threat level to
High (level orange). We conducted the first questionnaire survey when the Iraq war was dynamically
developing and the alert level was orange, and the second one exactly one year later, when the alert level
was lowered to yellow, yet the news reported US casualties on a daily basis.
                                                                                                                                                            
1 http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/213/1/1/
2 By supreme government, we mean the decision/policy maker of a national government. In the US government, this concept can
be understood as the federal level legislative bodies backed by some executive bodies.
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Theoretical Background
In this section, we first present the underlying rationale of our dependent variables, and then discuss the
theoretical concepts included in our model. 
Intention to use e-Government Services
The motivations of this study (i.e., promoting e-Government use and assuring dependable e-Government
services in a public emergency situation) are in line with the concept of information system success at
both user [13] and organizational  [14] levels. In this study, we combine both perspectives and propose to
use the concept of ‘intention to use e-Government website’ to measure both user satisfaction and
achievement of organizational objectives. A government can be understood as either a protector or a
controller of its citizens. For the protector role, citizens are both consumers of the protection service and
sensors (i.e., eyes and ears3) of the protector. In the e-Government context, citizens’ satisfaction with
respect to their government as a protector is determined by the quality of protection services provided by
e-Government systems, while the government’s performance as a protector is largely dependant on its
capabilities to gather intelligence and mobilize citizens through e-Government systems. Therefore,
citizens’ willingness to be informed by, follow directions of, and provide information to e-Government
can reflect the success of e-Government. Based on this viewpoint, we use two intention measures:
citizens’ Intention to Depend on Information on an e-Government website (IDI) and Intention to Provide
personal Information to the website (IPI).
The intention measure is more useful than actual usage behaviour in this context, because use of
most e-Government websites is totally voluntary, and actual usage behaviour, especially such behaviour
as providing leads and tips of a terrorist attack, does not occur often. Also, we assume that current e-
Government facilities are still in their primitive forms and do not provide every possible service that
citizens need. Therefore, intention measures are useful proxies of future use [15] in our study context. 
Direct Determinants of e-Government Usage Intentions
Factors that determine or predict user acceptance of information systems have been one of the most
intensively examined topics in MIS studies. Based on the well established traditional IT acceptance
theories [16, 17] and the newer e-commerce trust models [18, 19], we contend that citizens’ acceptance of
e-Government services can be understood in terms of two dimensions: direct utility value and risk
reduction.
Perceived Usefulness of e-Government Website
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [17, 20] contends that potential user’s acceptance and use of
an information system can be best explained by perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and
subjective norm. This model was built on the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) that views human
behaviour as a direct function of behavioural intentions, and beliefs as determinants of the intentions [21,
                                                
3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4861685/
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22]. In TAM, perceived usefulness was defined as “the degree to which a person believes that using a
particular system would enhance his or her job performance” [17 p.320], which explicitly reflects the
utility value that directly comes from system use. The significant effect of perceived usefulness has
consistently been found in most empirical studies, while users’ experience [23, 24] and voluntariness  [25,
26] diminish the effects of ease of use and subjective norm, respectively. Many other IT use studies also
reflect utility value as a major determinant of IT use/usage intention, in the form of task support and
future value [27], superior functionality [28, 29], instrument for extrinsic rewards [30], or job
performance [31]. Venkatesh et al. provide a comprehensive summary of the IT acceptance studies
centred around utility value [16]. Similar to the private sector counterpart, citizens’ acceptance of an e-
Government service will also be affected by the utility value of the service. However, it is difficult to
predefine the type of benefits from e-Government services that provides high utility value. Unlike a user
of an organizational
information system,
citizens can selectively
use a wide range of e-
Government services
that provide
heterogeneous
functions (e.g.,
supporting tax filing
tasks, introducing
activities of a
government agency,
disseminating public
safety information,
etc.), depending on
their temporal needs.
Also, one e-
Government website
can serve multiple functions (e.g., a gateway to another e-Government service, imposing control over
citizens, or providing public services) which are loosely coupled yet influencing each other. In this case,
measuring or comparing the service-specific utility of an e-Government function with another is neither
meaningful nor desirable. Therefore, we re-conceptualize the term “perceived usefulness” as the general
belief of an e-Government website visitor regarding the potential utility of the information and
functionality of the website, rather than adopting Venkatesh et al.’s concept of performance expectancy
that focuses on productivity, competitive advantage, and external rewards in workplace [16]. H1a and
H2b in the conceptual model (Figure 1) and Table 1 show the hypothesized positive relationships between
perceived usefulness and intentions to use e-Government website. 
Intention to Use
e-Gov Services
PUE
.
PSA
SQE
PTETrG
IPI
IDI
PRT
ExI
H1a
H1b
H2a
H2b
H3a
H3b
H4
H7a
H6a
H6b
H5a
H5b
H7c
H3c
DpT
H8
H1c
H7b
Figure 1. Conceptual Model
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We also hypothesize a positive effect of perceived usefulness on perceived trustworthiness (H1c).
Gefen et al. suggested the same relationship in the opposite direction based on social exchange theory
[32]. According to their argument, absence or incompleteness of contracts in social relationships (i.e.,
online shopping) requires trust to supplement online customers’ subjective expectation on the resulting
utility. While such an effect is certainly possible, it is also logical to expect bidirectional feedback loop
between the two constructs. Gefen et al.’s study was mainly concerned with discrete spot transaction
relationships where potential customers assess the utility of an online transaction at the point of
purchasing decision, and the transaction ends by receiving the ordered items. However, e-Government
websites are a result of government operations supported by taxpayers’ money. In this sense, perceived
usefulness of an e-Government website is an indicator of the website operators’ performance. In our cases
(i.e., NYSOPS, FBI and NYDMV), citizens would assess the government agencies’ operational
performance based on what they found on the websites, which may require them to revise their previous
beliefs in the agencies’ trustworthiness. This relationship is also parallel to the relationship between
government performance and government authority. Authority refers to the power or rights of a
government honoured by its citizens. From the social exchange perspective, the legitimacy of the power is
conferred on government in exchange for citizens’ satisfaction on the government performance [33, 34].
When an e-Government website does not provide useful services, citizens’ beliefs in the website
operator’s benevolence, integrity, and competence will decrease, which will undermine the operator’s
authority. 
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Relational Risk and Perceived Trustworthiness of e-Government Website
This study integrates an e-commerce trust model with the traditional theories of IT acceptance and use.
Prior literature has suggested trust as a critical success factor for e-commerce [19, 32, 35]. Mayer et al.
defines trust as “a willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the
Table 1. Hypotheses
Hypotheses Symbol
H1a. Perceived usefulness of an e-Government website (PUE) positively affects citizens’
intention to depend on information on the website (IDI).
PUE → IDI (+)
H1b. Perceived usefulness of an e-Government website (PUE) positively affects citizens’
intention to provide personal information to the website (IPI).
PUE → IPI (+)
H1c. Perceived usefulness of an e-Government website (PUE) positively affects
perceived trustworthiness of the e-Government website (PTE).
PUE → PTE(+)
H2a. Perceived trustworthiness of an e-Government website (PTE) positively affects
citizens’ intention to depend on information on the website (IDI).
PTE → IDI (+)
H2b. Perceived trustworthiness of an e-Government website (PTE) positively affects
citizens’ intention to provide personal information to the website (IPI).
PTE → IPI (+)
H3a. Perceived structural assurance of the Internet (PSA) positively affects citizens’
intention to depend on information on the website (IDI).
PSA → IDI (+)
H3b. Perceived structural assurance of the Internet (PSA) positively affects citizens’
intention to provide personal information to the website (IPI).
PSA → IPI (+)
H3c. Perceived structural assurance of the Internet (PSA) positively affects perceived
trustworthiness of e-Government websites (PTE).
PSA → PTE(+)
H4. Perceived risk of terrorism (PRT) positively affects perceived usefulness of e-
Government websites (PUE).
PRT → PUE(+)
H5a. Trust in supreme government (TrG) positively affects perceived trustworthiness of
e-Government websites (PTE).
TrG → PTE(+)
H5b. Trust in supreme government (TrG) positively affects perceived structural
assurance of the Internet (PSA).
TrG → PSA(+)
H6a. System quality of an e-Government website (SQE) positively perceived usefulness
of the e-Government website (PUE).
SQE → PUE(+)
H6b. System quality of an e-Government website (SQE) positively perceived
trustworthiness of e-Government websites (PTE).
SQE → PTE(+)
H7a. Disposition to trust (DpT) positively affects trust in supreme government (TrG). DpT → TrG(+)
H7b. Disposition to trust (DpT) positively affects perceived structural assurance of the
Internet (PSA).
DpT → PSA(+)
H7b. Disposition to trust (DpT) positively affects perceived trustworthiness of e-
Government websites (PTE).
DpT → PTE(+)
H8. Experience with the Internet (ExI) has a negative moderating effect on the
relationship between DpT and PSA (H7b)
DpTxExI →
PSA(-)
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ability to monitor or control that other party” [36 p.712]. Their organizational trust model suggests that
trust be determined by a trustor’s perception on the trustee’s trustworthiness (i.e., ability, benevolence,
and integrity) and the trustor’s propensity to trust. According to the model, trust leads the trustor to take a
risk in the relationship with the trustee. McKnight et al. extended and applied this model to the e-
commerce context [18, 19]. “Trusting beliefs” in their e-commerce trust model are equivalent to a
trustor’s beliefs in the trustee’s trustworthiness and “trusting intention” can be interpreted as the trustor’s
willingness to engage in the risky relationship with the trustee. This concept of trusting intention is
analogous to TAM’s concept of “intention to use” in our study context. Some studies based on this e-
commerce trust model provided empirical support for the validity of measurement model [19] and the
relationship between trusting beliefs and trusting intention [37]. In a recent paper, Gefen et al. also
combined perceived usefulness, ease of use, and trust as determinants of intended use and demonstrated a
significant effect of trust on the dependent measure [32]. As this relational trust allows people to dismiss
or overcome the risk of e-commerce vendors’ future misbehaviour, perceived trustworthiness of an e-
Government website agency can enable citizens to depend on the information from or disclose sensitive
information to the agency. As some e-Government services are jointly provided by multiple government
organizations or government contractors, we use the term ‘e-Government website (and its operator)’ to
generally represent the e-Government side entities related to an e-Government website-citizen interaction.
H2a and H2b (Table 1) hypothesize the positive (negative) relationships between perceived
trustworthiness of (relational risk from) e-Government website and e-Government usage intentions.
Risk from the Internet and Perceived Structural Assurance
Mayer et al. [36] argued that situational risks that are external to a particular relationship need to be
analyzed separately from trust because these risks are not related to the trustee's behaviour. In addition to
the relationship specific risk discussed in the previous section, there are two types of situational risks that
can influence citizens’ e-Government use: risks from technical and legal vulnerability of the Internet
environment (i.e., threat of hackers and Internet scam) and risks from the physical environment at a
particular time (e.g., threat of terrorism, natural disaster). These risks are external to the relationships
between citizens and e-Government websites and, therefore, must be separately analyzed. 
The e-commerce trust model suggests that institution-based trust have a direct effect and an
indirect effect, through trusting beliefs, on trusting intention [19]. Institution-based trust consists of
situational normality which reflects a trustor’s perception on the situation where everything seems normal
or in the right order, and structural assurance, which refers to the beliefs that legal and technological
safeguard are in place to protect the trustor. From this definition, we notice that the structural assurance
concept reflects the situational risk of the Internet environment, while the situational normality may
compound the appearance of an e-Government website and the conditions of the Internet and the physical
environments. Thus, we separate structural assurance and use to measure the risk of Internet Environment
in a reverse term. Our notion of structural assurance is narrower than Gefen et al.’s (2003) recent
manifestation in that we focus on citizens’ perception of the existing technology and legal infrastructure,
while Gefen et al.’s construct looked at website-specific components (i.e., 3rd-party seal, 1-800 number,
Lee and Rao ♦ Risk of Terrorism, Trust in Government, and e-Government Services / 8
statement of guarantees, and hyper-link with reputable websites). Having this narrower focus, perceived4
structural assurance of the Internet in our study context will have the same effect on usage intention as in
the e-commerce context because the concept is a counter-measure of the risk general to the Internet and
legal jurisdiction, which are over and beyond website operators’ control or discretion. Previous research
on citizens’ use of the Internet suggest that technological robustness of the Internet increase citizens’ use
of the Internet in an emergency. A report from such a survey shows that, on the day of the 9/11 terrorist
attack, 4-5 million people used the Internet to contact others because the telephone network was disrupted
[38]. Likewise, those who could not access the major Internet news sites (e.g., www.cnn.com,
www.msnbc.com) immediately after the 9/11 because of the temporal bottleneck may not want to depend
on e-Government websites for time-critical emergency services. These effects are hypothesized as H3a
and H3b (Table 1). Although our structural assurance does not include the above mentioned website-
specific components, there has been no empirical evidence that general perception of Internet
infrastructure does not affect the perceived trustworthiness of a website. As an exploratory study, we
include a positive relationship in our model and empirically test the effect (H3c).
Effects of External Threat
The second type of situational risks, “risks from the physical environment at the particular time,” refers to
the war in Iraq and threats of terrorism caused by the war in our study. In contrast to the other types of
situational risk (i.e., risk from the Internet), this external threat of terrorism affects the physical
environment of citizens, as opposed to the Internet environment. We hypothesize that the external threat
positively affects perceived usefulness (H4), thus have an indirect positive effect on the usage intentions.
This effect on the usefulness can be explained by the concept of subjective uncertainty and expected
utility [39, 40]. Subjective expected utility (SEU) assumes that there is no agreed-upon likelihood of
possible outcomes [41] and expressed as:
SEU(X) = ∑p(s)u(x(s)), where p(s) is the subjective probability of an outcome state (s), x(s) is the
consequence of the purchase/action of (X) at the outcome state (s), and u(x(s)) is the utility of the
consequence at the state (x(s)).
As assumed in SEU, there are a multiple number of states where an individual becomes a victim
of a terrorist attack (e.g., killed by a terrorism, losing loved one, having financial damage, etc.), and the
probability of the states are unknown. For each state, using an e-Government service will have different
utility. For example, knowing an evacuation plan for a bio-terrorism will be of a great help when such an
incident happens, and renewing a driver’s license online would be very useful when government
buildings became the targets of an anthrax attack. Therefore, increased external threats will have a
positive effect on perceived usefulness by increasing the subjective probability of risky states (p(s)) and
selectively increasing the utility of some e-Government services (i.e., anti/counter-terrorism services,
online transaction with high-profile government agencies) at the risky states (u(x(s))). Furthermore,
                                                
4 We use the term ‘perceived’ to emphasize that situational assurance is also a belief of citizens and that our construct is different
from Gefen et al.’s (2003) construct measured by more objective website components.
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anti/counter-terrorism websites not only provide information on how to cope with possible or existing
danger, but also provide information about the likelihood of possible risks. For example, the Department
of Homeland Security website provides the current level of terrorist threats and intelligence on possible
terrorism, which can reduce the ambiguity in the probability assessment. Ambiguity aversion is a
frequently observed behaviour in risky decision making [42], and is found to increase as the range of
possible probability increases [43] or the probability of negative outcome increases [44]. Therefore, a
perceived risk of terrorism will result in a higher demand, and thus, increase perceived usefulness of the
information that helps citizens to accurately assess the probability of the terrorist attacks. H4 in Table 1
presents the positive effect of perceived risk of terrorism on perceived usefulness.
Effects of Trust in Supreme Government
The last category of risk relevant to the e-Government context comes from uncertain future behaviour of
the supreme government. Although government organizations, including e-Government agencies, have
autonomous power and rights to some extent, every government organization is subject to the supreme
government’s control, a situation where the trustworthiness of the supreme government can be transfered
to e-Government agencies. After the 9/11 incidents, the federal government passed several laws that could
pose a risk to citizens’ rights by controlling information flow among government agencies. For example,
the Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) provision in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Title VIII,
Subtitle I) enables federal, state, and local authorities to share homeland security related information,
which was vaguely defined, and allows the President and the DHS Secretary to decide the use and reuse
of such information given to states and localities.5 For another example of such organizational control,
Attorney General John Ashcroft, in 2001, instructed federal agencies to hold back government
information, using the exemption clauses in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Consequently, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) reported a significant reduction of publicly available information
resulting from the instruction.6 The USA PATRIOT Act has conferred a great level of authority to federal
officials since 2001, which has increased concern about civil rights, and yet, additional legislation – i.e.,
Patriot II (Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003),7 Intelligence Authorization Act of 20058 –are
further threatening citizens’ privacy and freedom. 
In addition to its organizational control, the trustworthiness of supreme government can influence
that of e-Government websites through a cognitive categorization processes. The concept of the cognitive
categorization process was introduced in e-commerce trust studies by McKnight et al. [18]. According to
their explanation, people tend to trust an unfamiliar entity if the entity is a member of a reputable
organization and vice-versa (reputation categorization). Gefen et al. [32] also recognized this cognitive
process as an antecedent of trust (i.e., cognition-based trust antecedents). Nevertheless, they ruled out the
effects of cognition-based trust antecedents in non-initial relationships. Although the sample sites (i.e.,
                                                
5 http://www.ombwatch.org/homeland/OMBW-SBU.pdf, http://www.openthegovernment.org/article/articleview/49/1/16/
6 http://www.openthegovernment.org/article/subarchive/19/
7 http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf
8 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=s2386ris.txt
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NYDMV, FBI, NYDMV) are of fairly familiar government agencies, we include this relationship in our
model because Gefen et al.’s study did not conduct empirical tests on the relationship, and because we
aim to build a model that can be applied generally to various e-Government websites. 
As the highest legislative and executive body, the supreme government can also affect the
perceived structural assurance of the Internet by imposing regulations to industries. Because structural
assurance reflects legal safeguards by definition, the citizens’ belief that the supreme government will
protect their online activity by providing appropriate regulatory measures will increase their structural
assurance belief. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (Coppa),9 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act10
for financial the industry, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)11
exemplify such influence. Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize positive effects of trust in
supreme government on perceived trustworthiness of e-Government website (H5a) and on perceived
structural assurance (H5b). 
Control Variables
In order to avoid a spurious correlation, we include three control variables in our model. Previous
research suggested that the qualitative properties of a website such as organization/navigational quality,
retrieval speed, and interactivity (Palmer 2002; Kim et al. 2002; McKinney et al. 2002) are important
factors for e-commerce website success. System quality of an e-Government website, in our study,
captures those various system properties specific to an e-Government website. From a potential users’
standpoint, system quality can represent a dimension of the product/service quality itself (e.g., easy to
understand/navigate contents) as well as the quality of the product delivery channel (e.g., easy to
complete and interactive online applications/transactions, fast response of web server), both of which are
direct sources of the utility value. Also, a high quality system shows website users that the website
operator cares for them and has the competence to carry out online services [32, 45, 46]. McKnight et al.
also included a similar concept (i.e., perceived site quality) in their e-commerce trust model as a control
variable [19]. They hypothesized that perceived site quality can positively influence both perceived
trustworthiness (i.e., trusting beliefs) and trusting intentions (i.e., willingness to depend and subjective
probability of depending). However, their model did not take into account the effect of utility value, and it
is difficult to expect that people will (intend to) use a website just because its system quality is good.
Thus, we assume that usefulness perception fully mediates the effect of perceived system quality on the
intention to use the website. Including system quality as a common cause of perceived usefulness and
trustworthiness can also reduce the risk of spurious correlation between the two constructs (and thus of
H1c). These relationships are hypothesized as H6a and H6b in Table 1 and Figure 1.
Disposition to trust has been suggested to have positive effects on other trust factors (i.e.,
institution-based trust, trusting beliefs, trusting intentions) [19, 46], conditional to individuals’ direct
experience with the trustee [32]. That is, although this personal disposition is relatively stable and
                                                
9 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/04/coppa1.htm
10 http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/oldstuff_donotuse/index.html
11 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/
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influential to the individual’s beliefs in general, the effects are overridden by trustee-specific experience
[47]. When the effect exists, not including the disposition may result in spurious correlations between the
other trust factors. Therefore, we include disposition to trust in our model where trust in supreme
government and perceived situational assurance in the Internet are hypothesized to affect perceived
trustworthiness of an e-Government website. Also, we include experience with the Internet as a
moderating variable between disposition to trust and perceived structural assurance of the Internet.
Because we hypothesize that structural assurance beliefs, as a counter-measure of Internet risks, have
direct and indirect effects on the usage intentions, understanding the effect of Internet experience will
provide an important insight on how Internet savvy and novice users perceive risk from the Internet. The
positive effects of disposition to trust on trust in government, structural assurance, and perceived
trustworthiness of e-Government website are hypothesized as H7a, H7b, and H7c respectively (Table 1
and Figure 1). The experience effect on structural assurance is denoted as H8. This relationship, however,
is separately implemented as a direct effect (H8a) and an interaction effect with disposition to trust (H8b)
in the PLS structured model (Table 8 and Figure 2, 3, 4).
Research Design and Methodology
In order to examine the effects of the various types of risk, this study conducted two questionnaire
surveys at two points in time. The first survey was conducted in April 2003 when the second Iraq war was
dynamically developing and the Department of Homeland Security issued a high level (level Orange)
terrorism alert. The second survey was conducted in April 2004, about 11 months after the US President
declared the end of the war. The second survey was designed to achieve several research goals. As one of
the research objectives is to understand how to secure stable functioning of e-Government services when
risk of terrorism exists, the survey data should capture citizens’ perceptions of such a risk. Perceived
terrorism risk measured during a peaceful time would not allow the researchers to cover a wide range of
possible risk perceptions, which will make relationship detection more difficult. Furthermore, the data
gathered in two consecutive years provides useful insights about trends in public perceptions and
intentions, especially on issues of trust in supreme government. 
The survey was conducted in a large north-eastern US university located near the Canada-US
border. For the first survey, three versions of questionnaires were prepared to measure equivalent
constructs for three different e-Government websites: the New York State Office of Public Security
(NYSOPS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the New York State Department of Motor Vehicle
(NYDMY). These websites were selected to represent two levels (i.e., federal and state) and two roles
(i.e., protection and control) of e-Government authorities. These questionnaires were randomly distributed
to 240 students enrolled in an undergraduate-level management course and yielded 177 responses (73.8
percent). Subjects were required to visit and examine the informational content and transaction functions
of a specified e-Government website before answering the questionnaire. The same procedure12 was
followed during the second survey, which was administered to 219 undergraduate-level students in a
                                                
12 We only used two versions of questionnaire (FBI and NYDMV) in the second survey as the NYSOPS website had withdrawn a
transaction function that was required to be examined in the first survey. 
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management course. 137 completed questionnaires were returned with 62.6 percent response rate, and the
Department of Homeland Security’s terrorism threat advisory level was ‘elevated’ (level Yellow) during
the second survey period. 
The measurement and structured model was analyzed using PLS Graph v3, a partial least square
based Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) tool. PLS is an appropriate tool for relationship testing in a
theory development stage. As this study applies many theoretical relationships originally developed in a
private-sector environment and political world to a new context of e-Government, PLS provides better
insight for further refinement of our model. A detailed procedure is described in the Data Analysis
section.
Sampling and External Validity
As the time interval between the two surveys was about 11 months, and the courses where subjects were
recruited were similar, the two sample groups can be considered cohort-groups that share the same
demographic and psychological characteristics [48]. This sampling method provides a homogeneous
group of subjects, in our case, young, well educated, and Internet literate. The average age of the
respondents was 21.4 years old, all of them were in a bachelor degree program, and 95 percent of them
had been using the Internet for more than 3 years. McKnight et al. argued that this kind of student sample
can be a good proxy of the e-consumer population who are generally younger and more highly educated
than average consumers [19]. A citizen poll also found that American Internet users under the age of 30
or with college educations, utilized the Internet the most in relation to the Iraq war [49].  Even if this
homogeneous sample does not represent the total population of American citizens, it represents one of the
most intensive Internet user groups, which enables us to circumvent compounding effects from different
demographic groups. As one of the first studies to examine the effects of terrorism risk and trust in
government on citizens’ e-Government service use, the focus on a narrow group provides clearer picture
of the decision pattern and a rigid step for future theory extension. 
Although studies using student subjects have often been criticized for low external validity [50],
there were several reasons we believed that student sample would not compromise the validity and would
indeed be beneficial to this study. Unlike many empirical studies in the field of management, our survey
does not require the students to have work experience or to imagine a work place environment. As long as
they live in the US and are legitimate e-Government service users, the subjects are a perfectly valid
sample. This is a fundamental difference that distinguishes our student sample from other studies that
require a hypothetical role-play. Our sample is subject to external threats as US residents, and the younger
age range could lower the risk aversion factor, which would make the study more conservative.
Furthermore, students are not only legitimate users, but are also the most likely prospective users of our e-
Government website samples. NYDMV’s online driver’s license renewal service is a featured link on the
FirstGov,13 an acclaimed US government portal to 180 million federal and state e-Government web pages
[51]. Driver’s license and car registration are applicable to anyone in the US, and in fact, the DMV is one
                                                
13 http://www.firstgov.gov/ or http://www.firstgov.com/
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of the first US government agencies to deal with for many college students, including international
students. The NYSOPS and the FBI are representative anti/counter-terrorism government authorities, at
state and federal level respectively. For these reasons, our student sample represents a large portion of
potential e-Government website users and has high external validity.
Measurement Items
Most of the measurement items included in the questionnaires came directly from or were adapted from
previous research. The two types of e-Government usage intentions, intention to depend on information
on the e-Government website (IDI) and intention to provide personal information to the e-Government
website (IPI), were each measured by four indicators. They were originally developed in an e-commerce
trust measure study [19] and modified to reflect the specific context of the websites in question. Perceived
usefulness of an e-Government website (PUE) used three items that were developed based on the
perceived usefulness and relative advantage measures in the IT acceptance and use literature [17, 20, 28].
Perceived trustworthiness of an e-Government website (PTE) measure was adapted from McKnight et
al.’s e-commerce trust measurement model [19] with minimal changes in the wording. While the original
measure for trusting beliefs has three sub-constructs (i.e., benevolence, integrity, and competence), PTE is
measured by four items: three items from the three different sub-constructs, and one for competence in
online service. The three-item measures for perceived structural assurance of the Internet (PSA) and
disposition to trust (DpT)14 are directly from the structural assurance measure and disposition measure
respectively also developed in the e-commerce trust model. Trust in supreme government (TrG) was
measured by three items originally used to measure political trust in political science literature. System
quality of an e-Government website (SQE) is an emergent construct that had three formative indicators.
Each item represents heterogeneous website system properties that have been identified as important
quality factors in e-commerce and website design literature [52, 53]. The three-item measures for
perceived risk of terrorism (PRT)15 and experience with the Internet were newly developed for this study
as there was no widely accepted measure. Measurement items for the FBI website are presented in Table
2.
Table 2. Measurement Items. (FBI version: WebSite X = www.fbi.gov)
Intention to Use e-Gov Services 
IDI1. When a public security concern arises, I would feel comfortable depending on the information provided by WebSite X.
IDI2. I cannot depend on information in WebSite X for critical public security problems.*
IDI3. Faced with a difficult public security problem that required me to behave in a certain way, I would follow the directions of
WebSite X.
IDI4. If I have a public security concern in the future, I will not seek information at WebSite X. *
IPI1. I would be willing to provide my personal information like my name, address, and phone number on WebSite X if required
to use its online services.
                                                
14 DpT measure originally had 4 items, but one item (DPT4 in Table 2) was dropped due to low convergent validity in the
measurement model testing.
15 PRT measure originally had 4 items, but one item (PRT4 in Table 2) was dropped due to low convergent validity in the
measurement model testing. 
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IPI2. I will provide my social security number on WebSite X if needed to use its online services.
IPI3. I would be willing to share the specifics of my situation like my job, interests, and family information with WebSite X if
required to use its online services.
IPI4. I would be willing to provide my credit card information on WebSite X if I want to pay for any valuable services on it.
Perceived Usefulness of e-Gov Website
PUE1. I find using WebSite X useful.
PUE2. WebSite X provides useful information.
PUE3. Using WebSite X can be more effective than dealing with real people for the same service.
Perceived Trustworthiness of e-Gov Website 
PTE1. WebSite X (and its operator) is interested in my well-being, not just its own.
PTE2. WebSite X would keep its commitments.
PTE3. WebSite X is capable and proficient in public security service.
PTE4. WebSite X is capable and proficient in online service.
Perceived Structural Assurance of the Internet
PSA1. The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable using it to transact sensitive information.
PSA2. I feel assured that legal and technological structures adequately protect me from problems on the Internet even in an
emergency.
PSA3. I feel confident that encryption and other technological advances on the Internet make it safe for me to do business there.
Perceived Risk of Terrorism
PRT1. The [war | US stationary troops] in Iraq has created an emergency in the US.
PRT2. [This war | Involvement of the US government in post-war development of Iraq] will require me to be constantly vigilant
for terrorist acts in the US.
PRT3. The [war | tension between the US and Iraq] makes me concerned for my safety in the US.
PRT4. I watch or read news about US activities in Iraq as much as I can.**
Trust in Supreme (Federal) Government
TrG1. Most politicians in this country can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.
TrG2. I usually have confidence that the US government will do what is right.
TrG3. The US government will ensure that everybody who wants to work can find a job.
System Quality of e-Gov Website***
SQE1. WebSite X is effectively organized.
SQE2. WebSite X provides significant user interaction.
SQE3. In WebSite X, the speed of information display was too slow*.
SQE4. WebSite X provides feedback mechanisms.
Disposition to Trust
DpT1. In general, people really do care about the well being of others.
DpT2. In general, most folks keep their promises.
DpT3. Large majority of professional people are competent in their area of expertise
DpT4. I usually trust people until they give me a reason not to trust them.**
Experience with the Internet
ExI1. Number of transactions you have provided your credit card number over the Internet to an online entity for the last one
year:
ExI2. Number of transactions you have provided your personal information (e.g., social security number, drivers license
number) over the Internet to an online entity for the last one year:
ExI3. How many hours per week do you spend on the Web?
* Reverse-worded item. 
** Dropped item for low reliability reason. 
*** Emergent construct with formative indicators
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Data Analysis
After data cleaning,16 the resulting 269 cases
(Table 3) were first examined for sample group
characteristics. In order to provide meaningful
information about citizens’ threat perception
and e-Government usage intentions, group
characteristics of the two survey samples should be identical and the only differences between the
datasets should be the (length of) existence that the subjects perceived the abnormal event (i.e., the war
between the US and Iraq) and the consequent perception of terrorism risk and trust in supreme
government. The two groups seemed to share the same demographic characteristics in terms of the
average length of US residency and Internet use, computer skills, and web skills. Although the differences
in the average age and educational level were statistically significant, the cohort group sampling could
limit the differences within one-year gap. Table 4 shows detailed group demographics, including
independent T-test results.
 The measurement model was tested using PLS. In the reliability and validity testing stage, two
items (refer to Table 2) were dropped due to their low loadings. After the modification in the
measurement model, 4 out of our 30 (13 percent) reflective indicators were below 0.7. Among those 4,
one (ExI3) was about 0.59 and the other three (IDI3, IDI4, IPI4) were about 0.68. 
The ideal level of standardized
loadings for reflective indicators is 0.707
or higher, but 0.5 was considered to be
an acceptable level for a newly
developed scale or an application across
disciplines [54] [55]. Therefore, we
decided to retain the 4 items. Composite
reliabilities for all constructs were well
over the acceptable level of 0.7, and thus
good convergent validity was
demonstrated [56]. Discriminant validity
was tested by average variance extracted
(AVE) and cross-loadings. Every
construct’s AVE score was higher than
its correlations with other constructs (Table 5). The correlations between construct scores and
standardized reflective indicator values also showed that there was no significant cross-loading (Table 6).
                                                
16 Cases with extremely low variance or inconsistent answers to reversed-pair items were dropped from the first survey data. The
second survey questionnaire included two sincerity tester items that asked not to answer the items. Respondents who answered
any of those tester items were excluded. Obvious patterned-answers were also manually filtered out from the both datasets.
Table 3. Sub-sample Size per Year and Site
NYSOPS FBI NYDMV Total
2003 54 50 54 158
2004 - 53 58 111
Total 54 103 112 269
Table 4. Sample Statistics
Characteristics YEAR N Mean t df MeanDifference
2003 154 21.51 2.697** 262 0.97Age
2004 110 20.55
2003 143 3.01 7.478** 159 0.86Education+
2004 96 2.15
2003 155 17.361 -1.197 248 -1.0113Years in the
US+ 2004 102 18.373
2003 155 17.742 -0.219 256 -0.413Hours on the
Web /Week 2004 103 18.155
2003 157 5.1 -1.3 265 -0.15Expertise in
Computer 2004 110 5.25
2003 156 5.03 0.104 264 0.01Expertise in
Web 2004 110 5.02
* Significant at p<.05, ** Significant at p<.01 level
+ equal variance not assumed
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On the
confirmation of
acceptable
reliability and
validity, we tested
time difference in
the exogenous
variables (i.e.,
PRT, TrG, DpT,
SQE, ExI) and
constructed an
interaction effect variable (DpTxExI) with product indicators [57]. The time difference was tested by
comparing the mean values of the exogenous construct scores calculated by PLS. We expected that
perceived risk of terrorism (PRT) had been decreased during the 1 year interval, and all the others
remained the same. Interestingly, the independent t-test result showed that the average level of perceived
risk of terrorism was decreased but the magnitude was statistically non-significant. Instead, the level of
trust in the supreme government, on average, had decreased significantly during the same period. This
phenomenon may be explained by the continued conflict between the US and Islamic resistance in Iraq.
Although President Bush declared the end of major combat in 1 May 2003 with the death of 138
Americans, casualty and death of American soldiers and citizens in Iraq continue, exceeding the 1,000
people on 8 September 2004.17
                                                
17 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5911852/
Table 5. Inter-construct Correlation and AVE Values
IDI IPI PUE PTE PSA PRT TrG SQE DpT ExI
IDI 0.549
IPI 0.164 0.610
PUE 0.384 0.229 0.663
PTE 0.546 0.200 0.434 0.625
PSA 0.086 0.281 0.190 0.234 0.768
PRT 0.092 -0.021 0.126 0.123 0.009 0.593
TrG -0.018 0.174 0.086 0.140 0.362 -0.065 0.585
SQE 0.376 0.032 0.492 0.414 0.141 -0.003 -0.007 N/A*
DpT 0.148 0.063 0.270 0.259 0.338 -0.083 0.300 0.254 0.676
ExI 0.013 0.129 0.135 -0.01 0.276 0.094 0.034 -0.037 0.025 0.534
N/A*: Emergent construct with formative indicators.
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In addition, there were several perceivable terrorist threats between the official end of the war and our
second survey (e.g., the roll back of DHS’ terrorism threat level to “high” in December 2003, followed by
international flight cancellations and delays caused by terrorism intelligence). From these situations, we
assume that the extended period of the external threat hampered the deduction of perceived risk and trust
in the US government. 
The new variable, DpTxExI, is a construct designed to measure the interaction effect of
disposition to trust (DpT) and experience with the Internet (ExI) on perceived structural assurance of the
Internet (PSA). To measure the interaction effect, we followed the product indicators technique suggested
Table 6. Construct Score - Std. indicator Value Correlations : Cross-Loadings 
 IDI IPI PUE PTE PSA PRT TrG DpT SQE** ExI
IDI1 0.795 0.157 0.292 0.51 0.106 0.107 0.109 0.155 0.286 -0.027
IDI2 0.807 0.057 0.317 0.418 0.04 0.04 -0.066 0.103 0.27 0.042
IDI3 0.67 0.154 0.287 0.397 0.11 0.126 -0.019 0.118 0.285 0.077
IDI4 0.681 0.127 0.244 0.281 -0.004 0.001 -0.089 0.057 0.284 -0.051
IPI1 0.218 0.861 0.215 0.26 0.235 -0.008 0.12 0.016 0.137 0.058
IPI2 0.027 0.811 0.118 0.069 0.224 0.045 0.121 0.054 -0.045 0.19
IPI3 0.16 0.767 0.203 0.217 0.209 -0.026 0.172 0.066 -0.029 0.038
IPI4 0.106 0.68 0.188 0.07 0.213 -0.09 0.137 0.07 0.03 0.122
PUE1 0.296 0.213 0.869 0.402 0.159 0.149 0.086 0.249 0.41 0.144
PUE2 0.341 0.103 0.857 0.413 0.084 0.07 0.052 0.219 0.443 0.09
PUE3 0.304 0.257 0.707 0.227 0.238 0.086 0.074 0.188 0.344 0.095
PTE1 0.354 0.184 0.244 0.731 0.229 0.024 0.258 0.208 0.198 -0.142
PTE2 0.375 0.22 0.343 0.797 0.184 0.1 0.053 0.169 0.309 -0.042
PTE3 0.549 0.082 0.372 0.804 0.124 0.087 -0.001 0.202 0.395 0.049
PTE4 0.445 0.152 0.409 0.822 0.207 0.169 0.142 0.239 0.386 0.085
PSA1 0.049 0.292 0.175 0.176 0.891 0.005 0.337 0.321 0.139 0.29
PSA2 0.087 0.228 0.166 0.226 0.891 0.048 0.361 0.311 0.067 0.224
PSA3 0.091 0.228 0.162 0.22 0.862 -0.031 0.262 0.262 0.169 0.221
PRT1 0.07 0.016 0.045 0.067 -0.01 0.79 -0.065 -0.152 -0.041 0.13
PRT2 0.095 0.008 0.208 0.141 0.05 0.732 0.093 0.029 0.092 0.039
PRT3 0.052 -0.07 0.053 0.086 -0.016 0.803 -0.164 -0.063 -0.05 0.049
TRG1 -0.071 0.215 -0.036 0.091 0.274 -0.068 0.789 0.203 -0.04 0.035
TRG2 0.034 0.068 0.178 0.152 0.288 -0.097 0.76 0.3 0.05 -0.039
TRG3 -0.001 0.113 0.066 0.085 0.273 0.016 0.753 0.193 -0.025 0.081
DPT1 0.07 0.02 0.207 0.157 0.23 -0.117 0.236 0.865 0.27 0.061
DPT2 0.134 0.128 0.164 0.171 0.338 -0.07 0.314 0.815 0.1 -0.004
DPT3 0.168 0.011 0.298 0.321 0.271 -0.011 0.188 0.79 0.249 0.002
SQE1* 0.305 0.014 0.443 0.332 0.191 -0.031 0.006 0.273 0.818 -0.027
SQE2* 0.154 0.14 0.332 0.331 0.2 0.106 0.121 0.19 0.456 0.024
SQE3* 0.28 -0.042 0.236 0.209 -0.076 -0.036 -0.098 0.056 0.692 -0.057
EXI1 -0.03 0.149 0.077 -0.056 0.312 0.006 0.032 0.007 -0.041 0.827
EXI2 0.019 0.077 0.134 0.031 0.144 0.076 0.002 0.068 -0.002 0.759
EXI3 0.055 0.047 0.095 0.01 0.137 0.156 0.046 -0.029 -0.044 0.598
* Formative Indicator.
** Emergent Construct.
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by Chin et al. [57]. According to their study, this technique has a superior detection power and accuracy
in comparison to the summated regression technique. This technique was also appropriate to our study as
we already adopted PLS to test our structural model, and the additional interaction variable allows us to
jointly examine the potential direct effect and interaction effect of the moderating variable at the same
time. The standardized values of the three DpT and three ExI indicators were extracted from the PLS
measurement model’s data matrix and multiplied in MS Excel, resulting in 9 product indicators for
DpTxExI. 
The structured model was first tested with combined data (n= 269) to detect relationships general
to different times, situations, and e-Government agency characteristics. Then, the data were divided into
two groups; anti/counter-terrorism (ACT) and non-ACT e-Government services, in order to examine
relationships influenced by service domain and agency characteristics. ACT group includes FBI (n=103)
and NYSOPS (n=54) data, and the non-ACT dataset consists of NYDMV data (n=112). The results from
these analyses are presented in the next section. 
Results
Pooled Model – Direct Determinants
The graphical results of structured model analyses are
presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4. The combined data
model shows that many relationships found in the
private-sector IT/e-commerce acceptance studies also
hold in the e-Government context, but some
noticeable discrepancies also exist. First, the R2 of intention to provide personal information (IPI) was
much lower than the R2 of intention to depend on information (IDI). About 34 percent of variance in IDI
was explained by perceived usefulness of the e-Gov website (PUE) (β= .179, p< .01), perceived
trustworthiness of the e-Gov website (PTE) (β= .495, p< .01), and perceived structural assurance in the
Internet (PSA) (β= -.056, ns). In contrast, the R2 for IPI was only 12 percent. The effect of PTE, which
was very strong on IDI, was not significant on IPI (β= .082, ns). Instead, PSA became the strongest
predictor (β= .234, p< .01), followed by PUE (β= .155, p< .01). 
With regard to the inter-relationship between PTE, PUE, and PSA, positive effect of PUE on PTE
was statistically and substantively significant (β= .254, p< .01), while the effect of PSA was not (β= .081,
p> .05). 
Pooled Model – Indirect Determinants
A perceived risk of terrorism (PRT) was found to have a significant and positive effect (β= .132, p< .05)
on perceived usefulness of e-Government websites (PUE). Also, the positive effect of trust in supreme
government (TrG) on perceived structural assurance of the Internet (PSA) was found to be significant (β=
.263, p< .01). However, the hypothesized positive relationship between TrG and PTE was not supported
(β= .044, ns).
Table 7. Mean Difference in Exogenous Variables
2003 2004
Mean
Difference
t stat.
PRT 0.027 -0.038 0.065 0.521
TrG 0.203 -0.276 0.479 3.931**
DpT 0.032 -0.045 0.077 0.619
SQE -0.067 0.096 -0.163 -1.312
ExI 0.037 -0.054 0.091 0.733
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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The system quality of an e-Government website (SQE) showed a very strong positive effect on
PUE (β= .501, p< .01) and a strong positive effect (β= .277, p< .01) on PTE. Another control variable,
disposition to trust (DpT) had strong positive effects on both trust in the supreme government (TrG) (β=
.311, p< .01) and the structural assurance (PSA) (β= .259, p< .01), but not on the trust in e-Government
websites (PTE) (β= .078, ns). In addition to DpT, experience with the Internet (ExI) (β= .277, p< .01) and
the interaction of the two variables (DpTxExI) (β= .146, p< .01) had significant positive effects on the
structural assurance (PSA). 
ACT Model 
In the next step, we analyzed only the data from anti/counter-terrorism e-Government services (ACT)
(i.e., NYSOPS and FBI) in order to capture idiosyncratic characteristics of the particular service class.
The ACT model showed a relationship pattern similar to the pooled model. Perceived Trustworthiness of
an e-Government website (PTE) is again the strongest determinant (β= .564, p< .01) of the dependency
intention (IDI), followed by the usefulness perception (PUE) (β= .187, p< .01). Interestingly, the negative
non-significant effect of structural assurance perception (PSA) in the pooled model became more
substantive and statistically significant (β= -.143, p< .05). 
For the intention to provide personal information (IPI), PSA was the only significant determinant
(β= .234, p< .05). PUE had a larger path coefficient (β= .167, ns) than the pooled model, but statistically
non-significant. The
variances explained for
IDI and IPI were about
44 percent and 8
percent respectively,
showing a lack of
explanatory power of e-
commerce determinants
for online e-
Government
transactions. The effect
of PUE on PTE was
again strong and
significant (β= .342, p<
.01), while that of PSA
on PTE was not (β=
.054, ns).
Figure 2. Effects of Risk and Trust on e-Gov Usage Intention (NYSOPS, FBI, and DMV)
Intention to Use
e-Gov Services
PUE
R2=.283
PSA
R2=.297
SQE
PTE
R2=.280
TrG
R2=.097
IPI
R2=.119.
IDI
R2=.341
PRT
DpTxEx
I
0.179**
0.155**
0.495**
0.082
-0.056
0.234**
0.132*
0.311**
0.501**
0.277**
0.044
0.263**
0.078
0.081
DpT
0.277**
0.254**
0.259**
ExI
0.146**
Lee and Rao ♦ Risk of Terrorism, Trust in Government, and e-Government Services / 20
In terms of the effects of perceived risk of terrorism (PRT) and trust in the government (TrG),
ACT model showed the same effects on the direct determinants as in the pooled model. PRT had a
significant positive relationship with PUE (β= .179, p< .05). TRG had a significant and positive effect on
PSA (β= .276, p< .01), but not on PTE (β= .062, ns) again. System quality (SQE) had a strong positive
effect on PUE (β= .412, p< .01) and PTE (β= .281, p< .01), as disposition to trust (DpT) had on TrG (β=
.252, p< .01) and PSA (β= .240, p< .01). Experience with the Internet (ExI) also significantly influenced
PSA (β= .364, p< .01), but the interaction effect (DpTxExI) became non-significant (β= .157, ns), in spite
of the larger path coefficient than the pooled model.
Non-ACT Model 
The relationship pattern found in NYDMV service data revealed striking deviation from the ACT model.
Most of all, the positive effects of perceived usefulness (PUE) (β= .155, ns) and the structural assurance
belief (PSA) (β= .049, ns) on intention to depend on information (IDI) became statistically non-
significant, resulting in much less variance explained (R2= .266) than in the ACT model. On the other
hand, the effect of perceived trustworthiness of the e-Government website (PTE) on intention to provide
personal information (IPI) (β= .293, p< .01) greatly increased and explained a larger portion of the
variance in IPI (R2= .245), compared to the ACT model. The inter-relationships between the direct
determinants (i.e., PUE, PTE, PSA) were statistically not supported. The effect of perceived risk of
terrorism (PRT) on PUE was positive, but not statistically significant (β= .118, ns). The direct effect of
experience with the Internet (ExI) (β= .175, p< .05) and its interaction effect with DpT (β= .207, p< .05)
on PSA were both positive and significant. Other control variables (i.e., SQE and DpT) showed the same
effects as in the other two models. Table 8 summarizes the results of hypotheses testing. 
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An important
finding from the
analysis is the
inconsistency of the
relationships in
different e-
Government service
categories.
Although the
relationship pattern
in the pooled model
generally confirms
previous findings in
the private sector,
the disaggregated
models reveal the
idiosyncrasy of
each service class
and the lack of
explanatory power
of the traditional
information system
acceptance models.
The most
distinguishable
difference is that
the magnitude of
the effects of
perceived
usefulness (PUE),
perceived
trustworthiness
(PTE), and
perceived structural
assurance (PSA)
change significantly
depending on the
domain and the type
of e-Government Figure 4. Effects of Risk and Trust on e-Gov Usage Intention (NYDMV)
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Figure 3. Effects of Risk and Trust on e-Gov Usage Intention (NYSOPS and  FBI)
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services. That is, PTE has a strong positive effect on IDI, but not on IPI for ACT service category, while
it exerts strong positive effects on both IDI and IPI for non-ACT services. Also, PSA shows a negative
effect on IDI in ACT cases, but not in the non-ACT cases. Yet, PSA demonstrates a consistent positive
effect on IPI for both models. Another important finding is that perceived risk of terrorism (PRT)
significantly affects PUE only for ACT services, although its positive effect exists in non-ACT services.
Trust in supreme government (TrG) positively and significantly affects PSA, and the effect is consistent
across service categories. Finally, the positive sign of the interaction variable DpTxExI suggests that the
effect of Internet experience (ExI) on PSA requires a supplementary relationship with disposition to trust
(DpT) rather than a complementary relationship. 
Discussions
This study integrated various theories of IS acceptance previously developed in the private sector, and the
model was extended in the e-Government context to explore the effect of terrorism risk and trust in
government on citizens’ e-Government usage intentions. Citizens’ perceptions and usage intentions on
two classes of e-Government websites, ACT and non-ACT service websites, were analyzed as a whole, as
well as disaggregated groups. The results are very interesting. Most of all, the result suggests that external
threats affect citizens’ use of e-Government website in two ways. First, perceived risk of terrorism
significantly increases perceived usefulness of anti/counter-terrorism e-Government. This relationship is
evident, but not significant in non-ACT cases. It seems that when an external threat is realized, people
perceive e-Government services that are directly related to the threat to be more useful, and are inclined to
depend on the information provided by those e-Government websites. Second, trust in supreme
government, which had dropped significantly over the research period, has considerable impact on
perceived structural assurance of the Internet. When TrG decreases, citizens’ belief in the safety of the
Internet infrastructure also decreases, which in turn will impair citizen-to-government information
transactions through e-Government websites. 
Table 8. Summary of Hypotheses Testing
Hypotheses Pooled Model ACT Model Non-ACT Model
H1a. PUE →IDI (+) Supported Supported Not supported
H1b. PUE → IPI (+) Supported Not supported Not supported
H1c. PUE → PTE (+) Supported Supported Not supported
H2a. PTE → IDI (+) Supported Supported Supported
H2b. PTE → IPI (+) Not supported Not supported Supported
H3a. PSA → IDI (+) Not supported Opposite Direction Not supported
H3b. PSA → IPI (+) Supported Supported Supported
H3c. PSA → PTE (+) Not supported Not supported Not supported
H4.   PRT → PUE (+) Supported Supported Not supported
H5a. TrG → PTE (+) Not supported Not supported Not supported
H5b. TrG → PSA (+) Supported Supported Supported
H6a. SQE → PUE (+) Supported Supported Supported
H6b. SQE → PTE (+) Supported Supported Supported
H7a. DpT → TrG (+) Supported Supported Supported
H7b. DpT → PSA (+) Supported Supported Supported
H7b. DpT → PTE (+) Not supported Not supported Not supported
H8a. ExI → PSA (+) Supported Supported Supported
H8b. DpTxExI → PSA (-) Opposite Direction Not supported Supported
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For anti/counter-terrorism services, perceived trustworthiness of the e-Government website is the
most critical determinant of citizens’ intention to depend on the information. Perceived usefulness of the
website is also an important factor, but its effect is largely mediated by PTE. Both PUE and PTE are
strongly influenced by the system quality of the website. Our SQE measure includes organization,
interactivity, loading speed, and feedback mechanism of a website. Therefore, e-Government initiatives
need to improve those dimensions of their system quality in order to improve citizens’ PUE and PTE,
which will lead to higher intention to use the websites. Also, finding additional dimensions and
developing more specific measure of system quality will be a meaningful study.
The contradicting negative relationship between perceived structural assurance in the Internet and
IDI is significant for the ACT model, and it seems real. This may be explained by service substitutability,
or information availability. IDI for ACT services are usually terrorism related news, directions, advice,
etc.. Such information can be acquired not only from e-Government websites but also from non-
government websites (e.g., news networks, terrorism research NGOs). When the Internet is technically
and legally robust and reliable, there is no reason for citizens to depend on a single source of information.
In fact, a citizen poll [49] shows that 56 percent of American Internet users went to online websites
immediately before and after the break out of the Iraq war, and the most important reason for that was to
get news from a variety of sources (66 percent), followed by timeliness of the information (63 percent).
Supporting this, US government sites were the third most frequently visited sites, following American TV
network (32 percent) and newspaper (29 percent) sites. Citizens also referred to foreign news
organizations (10 percent). Disappearance of this negative effect in non-ACT services may also result
from information availability. Even if non-government websites are equally reliable, there are not many
websites that can provide as comprehensive and accurate information about automobile/traffic regulations
as DMVs. Therefore, it is expected that only when a government agency is the original and the only
source of information, structural assurance of the Internet can increase citizens’ reliance intention on the
information provided by the website. 
With regard to citizens’ intention to provide personal information, the only significant
determinant in our ACT model was perceived structural assurance of the Internet, which resulted in a very
low explanatory power (R2 < .08). This shows a clear contrast to the non-ACT model that perceived
trustworthiness in e-Government website exerts a significant effect (β= .293, p< .01), explaining about 25
percent of IPI, together with PSA (β= .323, p< .01). Moreover, additional t-test and ANOVA revealed
that the mean value of IPI in ACT service category is significantly lower than that in non-ACT services.18
When it is considered that most ACT services require citizens to provide personal information when they
report terrorism-related information, we can predict that the current ACT e-Government websites fall
short in its capability, and yet we do not know how to remedy this problem. Therefore, what causes the
low intention of citizens to provide personal information to ACT class e-Government websites is left as
an important and urgent topic of future research. Until we find additional determinants of IPI, we may
                                                
18 Tukey, Scheffe, and Bonferroni Post-Hoc tests all showed significant mean difference between Non-ACT (i.e., NYDMV) and
ACT (i.e., NYSOPS and FBI) services at p<.05. The difference between ACT-State (i.e., NYSOPS) and ACT-Federal (i.e., FBI)
was not significant at the same significance level. IDI values of the two (ACT vs. non-ACT) and three (non-ACT State vs. ACT-
State vs. ACT-Federal) groups were statistically identical.
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need to improve citizens’ perception on Internet safety, which can be achieved through increasing
citizens’ trust in the supreme (i.e., federal) government and increased use and experience of the Internet in
general.
Another noticeable result is that trust in supreme government does not have a significant effect on
perceived trustworthiness of a specific e-Government website. The path coefficients were negligible
across the different e-Government categories (β= .062, ns for ACT; β= .022, ns for non-ACT). Therefore,
we can conclude that, at least in the US government organization, trust in the supreme government is not
inherited to its e-Government agencies in the organizational hierarchy. This means that even if citizens
highly trust the supreme government, e-Government websites may not be able to benefit from its
membership in the government organizations, and must build their own trustworthiness. As mentioned
above, improving system quality of their website is one way to do so.
In sum, the findings of this study revealed the stark difference between different domains and
types of e-Government services. As a consequence, the models and determinants from previous IS
acceptance theories are limited in their applicability and explanatory power in the context of e-
Government. The results of our analysis provide valuable information about the idiosyncratic
characteristics and important factors in e-Government acceptance models, which can be used for further
development of theories and measurement instruments that can better fit the e-Government context. We
hope that our results provide many e-Government and public safety researchers with useful empirical
evidence and rich insight on how external threats influence citizens’ intention to use e-Government
services. Government, with these findings, will also be able to secure stable functioning of its online
operations and improve services, especially in the presence of an external threat.
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